A SHORT DISCUSSION OF COMPLEXITY
What has come to be known as complexity, broadly interpreted, has a long and illustrious history among economists. Smith's system of the division of labour and development of knowledge is a self-organizing system of systems (Potts 2001a) . Selective connections are crucial to Smith, Marshall, Menger and Hayek in bringing into focus connections between social and economic organization and the development of knowledge (Loasby 1999 (Loasby , 2001 ). Simon's substantial contribution is discussed elsewhere in this collection, especially in Jean-Luis Le Moigne's chapter. Foster (1993) returns to Marshall and develops the theme of time-irreversibility into a self-organizing and complex framework, itself an argument in sympathy with Young (1928) , Richardson (1960) and Loasby (1978) .
Forming a canon is though, but one element of complexity research, of realizing that we have been undertaking something of this nature in theoretical and empirical analyses for a long time (Brown 1993; Dopfer et al. 2004, p. 268 fn. 9) . We also have a style of undertaking empirical analysis through 'history-friendly modelling'. This has been undertaken in order to address the long-recognized confl icts inherent in endeavouring to provide explanations of historical and contextual phenomena in more general terms. 'History friendly' implies a combination of both informal or appreciative theories developed in situ, perhaps involving the formulation of 'stylized facts,' and established theories that purport to be of more general application. Further, researchers usually seek to articulate their fi ndings in a manner which betrays an intention to be of more general application than a particular spatial and temporal context (Dopfer 2001; Potts 2001b) . Groundbreaking examples include Arthur's (1994) El Farol problem, Härdle and Kirman's (1995) analysis of buying behaviour in the Marseille fi sh market, and Malerba et al.'s (1999) analysis of the computing industry.
An important feature of history friendly analysis and modelling is its inherent capacity to allow researchers to think through the consequences of things feasibly having been different. This is established in Nelson and Winter's (1982) industry simulations. Potts (2000) draws upon graph theory to describe the concept of adjacent spaces, which may as yet be unoccupied, and of unmade but feasible connections that characterize particular contexts. For Potts, the ontology of (broadly) economic space is described appropriately by networks -of made and unmade connections -and not fi elds. Further, the connections are loosely hierarchical, of systems and subsystems. Following Simon (1962) , patterns of connections made and unmade imply subsystems within systems that are nearly-decomposable. And the condition of nearly-decomposable includes the potentially treacherous and ambiguous qualifi cation of 'nearly'. In devising and enacting policies, the nearness of nearly is of critical importance (Loasby 1976) .
Complexity is about emergent properties within systems, with these emergent properties necessarily betraying some form or degree of orderliness (Archer 1995; Delorme 2001) . Complexity is also about processes and dynamics taking place within and across contexts located in time and space (Foster 1993) . Emergence implies that there are, ontologically, levels because there are usually no simple ways of identifying a whole in terms of its parts and vice versa. Groups within fi rms are not smaller versions of the fi rm, industries are not summations of identical fi rms and fi rms are not smaller replications of industries. These distinctions of levels though are of little interest or relevance without processes and dynamics taking place over time. At risk of lingering a little too long over fi rms, industries and the organization of production, Penrose's (1959) explanation of the growth of the fi rm continues to be a source of inspiration for complexity researchers.
Penrose's fi rms produce or accumulate free resources inevitably as a consequence of their normal activities and the normalization of these activities. Some entrepreneurs or managers pursue strategies of growth and devote resources to capturing these free resources and applying them to perceived opportunities. Something like free resources can be the subject of managerial deliberation and planning, given a subjective vision, but in the context of an acquired and inherited way of doing things and way of seeing things. Note that these seemingly free resources, released through processes of routinization and familiarity, require deliberation, planning and integration around a vision. The process is dynamic. Cyert and March (1963) also include resources that are strictly non-productive, and so potentially free, in their explanation of the fi rm. Following Cyert and March, these resources are tied up in organizational slack, which is essential in allowing a fi rm to adapt in the face of uncertainty, and also to absorb disputes that inevitably arise internally. Slack prevents disorder, which is another dimension of contributing to growth.
Only fairly recently have researchers begun undertaking empirical analysis of the potential for disorder caused by the strategic process of capturing resources from within the fi rm and directing these at additional perceived opportunities. Flaherty (2000) provides an explanation of experimentation in semiconductor production. The focus of experimentation is again design, but this time the planning is as much concerned with the avoidance of unintended creative destruction of established practices as it is with the articulation of new visions. Complexity in the economy, then, is about order as self-organization or at least organization from within a system (Thompson 1967; Loasby 1991; Foster 1993; Kauffman 1993; Potts 2000) . Order in complex systems must be explained rather than assumed and is an appropriate focus of policy deliberation. Following Luhmann (1995) , complexity embodies the potential for order but, a priori, order is improbable.
POLICY PRESUMING COMPLEXITY
Policy analysis given complexity differs radically from a good deal of that set out in other traditions of economic research. The opportunities for system closure and aggregation implied by Walrasian welfare economics cannot be assumed by complexity researchers. Rather, complexity researchers can provide explanations of on-going tendencies for increasing returns and for the effects of events being local or contextual as they are located in time and space. Given complexity, with its ontology of networks, contexts, selective connections, subsystems and systems, and near-decomposability, we have little option but to adopt a broad understanding of policy. Policy is like strategy in that it can involve (in no particular order): an active or deliberative capture and review of a pattern (or range of feasible patterns) of connections around some issue; boundary drawing around issues and elements considered to be proximate, so designating other elements as distant; articulating visions of why and how things can be different; selecting a vision and course of activities consistent with it; undertaking a set of activities in motivation of a vision; a rejection of other activities on the basis of them not being consistent with the vision; and reviewing activities to consider how things are turning out with respect to the vision. Policy-makers and strategists may consider it expedient to undertake a trial or experiment, and may have the opportunity of so doing. This is notwithstanding diffi culties in isolating and interpreting causes and effects, and drawing sound inferences from observations and codifi cations of subsequent events, whether expected or unexpected (Hendry and Seidl 2003) .
Policy and strategy share considerable common ground, both in terms of requiring similar types of activities, or requiring similar sets of capabilities, and in terms of the nature of contexts within which policy and strategy are appropriate or relevant activities. But by drawing attention to policy and strategy as activities, and also as taking place in more or less appropriate contexts, we see that they are not synonymous, even though distinctions may be subtle. Policy is intended to be more general than strategy which in turn is more general than activities. Individuals, organizations and governments can, for example, all formulate policies, strategies and actions. Some actions can be undertaken with the aim of formulating and undertaking strategies and policies, and some strategies may be pursued with the aim of shaping one's own or others' policies, strategies or activities.
Policies have a more pronounced social or public dimension to them, as they speak of a commitment to undertaking some actions and so excluding other actions in the event of envisaged and so feasible future circumstances. Policy is associated with the acquisition, embodiment, enhancement and protection of reputation and legitimacy, in processes of formulating policies. These public contingencies are all put at risk in formulating visions of feasible future events, deciding upon which actions to include and which to exclude, in then deciding whether actual events fi t into those envisaged by the policy, and in being accountable (even if only to one's self). A strategy may be articulated or inferred by 'outsiders', but the notion of 'outsider' is different in the context of policy as policy is by its nature articulated and codifi ed in the expectation of it being communicated and understood widely by others. All these episodes in the formulating, undertaking, reviewing of and accounting for policy may well merge with strategy, but the bigger picture, the connecting thread, and the overall sense of current and future accountability, distinguish policy from strategy.
The differences between activities, strategies and policies can be interpreted as matters of degree rather than type, but the distinctions are signifi cant. The very idea of these being different is more easily understood given a network ontology and graph-theoretic representation of complexity. Policy-making, more than activities and strategies, is about agents -more or less powerful agents -deliberating over order, or more accurately types of orders as order itself cannot be presumed to be in some way singular and neutral. These deliberations, whether undertaken, for example, individually, or within organizations, or in governments, are time and resource consuming, so, of course, impose opportunity costs.
Economists have well-established explanations of the activities involved in policy-making where agents are modelled as if possessing rational or adaptive expectations. But these models presume policy-making taking place 'off-line' and outside the economic system in question (often a national economy). By assuming complexity, and so an economic system and connected subsystems, policy is an activity within this system, involved in affecting an emerging order. Even simulations and other attempts at learning-before-doing (or superfi cially 'off-line') can leak out selectively into other contexts through network connections.
Our discussion of why we have activities centred on policy has functionalist overtones, in that we have constructed an explanation of policy activities predicated upon there being something called 'policy'. Prima facie, policymaking is required as part of the process of coordinating activities, plans, strategies and other policies at different levels or in connected subsystems. Given shared expectations of the fi xity or rigidity inherent in policies alongside complexity in the broadly economic systems and subsystems, policies are likely to be abandoned sooner or later. Events develop in unforeseen ways and subsystem boundaries reveal themselves to be different, or change anyway perhaps as unintended consequences of policies, despite the power of policies to shape agents' plans. But complexity can come to the rescue of policy-making, and the social reputations and legitimacies of those undertaking policy-making endeavours, by providing some grounds for setting-out reasons for modifying or abandoning policies.
COMPLEXITY AND EVOLUTION
Complexity provides a particular perspective on evolutionary explanations of dynamic processes, and of the potential for order to emerge within these dynamic processes (Kauffman 1993) . The nature of the distinction between complexity and other evolutionary approaches is diffi cult to pin down because of differences in the ways in which researchers have adopted evolutionary terminology. Ambiguous interpretations of evolution permit complexity to co-exist with more functionalist ideas of survivor selection, with Lamarckian processes of heredity, and with Darwinian explanations. Universal Darwinism or Universal Adaptation is a precise model and has presented researchers among broadly economic phenomena with greater challenges. Loasby (2002) has warned against the uncritical application of biological models of evolution. Hodgson (2002) , Knudsen (2002) and Hodgson and Knudsen (2004) start instead with a Universal Darwinian or Universal Adaptationist ontology (that is, one that begins neither in social nor life sciences) and have applied this to models of fi rms, workgroups within fi rms, industries and markets.
In distinguishing complexity from other similar or complementary explanations within evolutionary analysis, we can draw on Simon (1962) and Potts (2000) . Simon argues that social systems that are broadly hierarchical, and characterized by near-decomposability, are likely to be favoured by evolutionary processes of selection. This insight has since been developed into the modularity research tradition (Sanchez and Mahoney 1996; Brusoni and Prencipe 2001; Langlois 2002) . Given near-decomposability, modules of activities, connected by an architecture (of an overall system and its groups, modules or subsystems), standards (especially of communication, of making utterances in the expectation that these will be understood, and that responses and non-responses can also be interpreted) and interfaces (of the proximity of groups, modules or subsystems) are expected generally to be better at absorbing and localizing disruptive shocks without threatening the entire integrity and functioning of an overall system. Potts (2000, p. 91) articulates the hypothesis of 'evolution towards complexity' from within a graph-theoretic or network framework. Simplicity and near-chaos are other broad descriptions of patterns of connections within systems. Simplicity implies a low ratio of connectivity to elements, so constrained patterns of communication and missing links between elements that may, if connected, be productivity enhancing. Near-chaos offers too high a ratio of connections to elements within a social system, with none of the localizing effects of modularity discussed by Simon.
Complexity and evolution by selection are complements in the argument of evolution towards complexity because the processes of selection and retention are schematically external to the system being discussed, of being in that system's environment. At risk of gross simplifi cation, while agents in systems, such as fi rms or industrial networks, can choose different patterns of organization, and so introduce variation across some wider population, which tend towards routine over time through repetition, selection is in markets. And markets, as a means or location of selection, can form environments for the (complex) systems in question. If the systemenvironment boundary or horizon is diffi cult to draw in theory or practice, the role of selection becomes ambiguous. Knudsen (2002) has addressed Nelson and Winter's (1982) research agenda by arguing that routines could in principle have the roles of both replicator and interactor. Following Cohen et al.'s (1996) discussion, we know that necessarily social or inter-personal routines can be 'fi ne-grained' or 'large-grained', and that each may have different roles or functions when considered in complex and evolutionary terms. We may have simultaneous processes of variation, selection and retention on-going among different 'levels' of economic phenomena, or we need to identify the most likely levels and hence system boundaries, within which to understand variation, selection and retention. Hodgson and Knudsen (2004) argue that fi rms rather than work groups within firms may appropriately be thought of as interactors within a Universal Darwin or Universal Adaptation framework. Without specifi cally drawing on contributions to modularity, they argue that work groups are too dependent on fi rms so are insuffi ciently decomposable from fi rms -and so presumably from other work groups in a particular fi rm -to interact independently within an environment with other agents. This may be compared with Brusoni and Prencipe's (2001) analysis of modularity, in which they argue that agents called system integrators have a necessary role in ensuring system and module integrity within and also across fi rms. In other words, architecture, interfaces and standards are not autonomous or self-organizing guarantors of near-decomposability, but require active management and authority. So selection in the Universal Darwinian sense can infi ltrate the boundaries of the fi rm.
The idea of fi rms being organized as 'higher-level' entities or systems that draw upon work groups is only one model of the organization of productive activities. There are occasions where work groups and fi rms coincide, but there are other common circumstances where activities are undertaken as joint ventures or other coalitions, especially in industries characterized by projects. Further, we should ask why stop at fi rms? Araujo et al. (2003) map the 'multiple boundaries of fi rms'. Holmen and Pedersen (2003) draw out different means, especially intensities, of communication in the activity of 'strategizing' among networks of fi rms. Such cases are analogous to fi rms and work groups, only this time the work group could be a 'corresponding fi rm' instead of a work group, with means of connection and communication being irreducible to either fi rm.
The complexity and Universal Darwinism or Universal Adaptation approaches seem to envisage similar ontologies. Researchers and other agents also have a good deal of discretion in matching boundaries or horizons to their social systems, given an understanding of a problem. But the focus of research questions has at least a different emphasis. In complexity, selforganization is within a system, and probably involves subsystems and sub-subsystems. In Universal Darwinism or Universal Adaptation, the overriding interest in selection requires that systems are varied, stable, connected through selection itself so being nearly-decomposable, and solving of the replicator-interactor identity. Even if we can push selection beyond a system's boundaries -that is, if we can identify system boundaries -we still have vital research questions to resolve in assessing how and whether a system attains its essential 'systemness'.
We could go further in our adoption Universal Darwinism or Universal Adaptation, perhaps as 'Ultra-Darwinism' (Stoelhorst, this volume). Following Dawkins (1989) and Maynard Smith (1982) we should identify agents in the role of interactors that have the role of housing and being instructed by gene-like replicators. This ontology has been infl uential among evolutionary game theorists, who have followed Maynard Smith in seeking to explain order in systems in the identifi cation of evolutionarily stable strategies (Gintis 2000) .
Following Kauffman (1993) , complexity and self-organization are complementary research questions to evolution by natural selection. Complexity takes the focus from natural selection, admitting that it may at times act weakly, but without disorderly consequences. Instead, we may focus fi rst on how broadly economic activities take on the characteristics of fairly orderly and on-going or autopoietic social-economic systems (Luhmann 1995) . Indeed, Dopfer et al. (2004, p. 266) argue that a complex rule structure, which is how they explain knowledge, is of greater importance than selection processes as it aids our understanding of variety. Further, they advise that we view broadly economic phenomena, systemically, as one of a population of actualizations of some 'generic rule'.
For some questions and contexts, system boundaries might coincide with fi rm boundaries, as argued by Hodgson and Knudsen (2004) . In other circumstances, it may be sensible -and in accordance with Hodgson and Knudsen's implicit criteria of near-decomposability -for researchers, agents and policy-makers alike to consider the system boundary as extending to consumers as producers (Bianchi 1998) or consumers as innovators (von Hippel 1988) . In still others, the project organization might be the appropriate system boundary, within, between or in the absence of companies. 
AN OUTLINE OF THIS COLLECTION
We have organized the chapters of this collection into four parts. The fi rst part is an introduction to the key themes of complexity and economics. Part II addresses the tensions of historical and general explanations, and of complexity and evolution. Part III takes the complexity and evolution argument further by addressing the role of transaction costs in guiding patterns of organization. Part IV is about policy-making in explicitly complex systems, including companies, industries and governments. We begin the collection with a chapter based on an interview with W. Brian Arthur, conducted on behalf of the European Association for Evolutionary and Political Economy by Robert Delorme and Geoffrey Hodgson. Arthur explains how his interest in complex systems developed, in part through a growing dissatisfaction with neoclassical explanations that seemed to rule out the possibility of persistent increasing returns among some economic activities. As researchers, we are advised to develop and redevelop theories that help us understand and explain the economy as the structures of the economy are continually changing too. Further, we are urged to 'fearlessly explore', as the fi eld of complexity and economics has benefi ted from initial insights that have opened up rather than 'cleaned up' the research tradition. Alan Kirman's chapter reviews and develops the concept of self-organizing systems. We are taken back to our early experiences of economics, and of how troubling we may have found our understandings of coherent aggregate phenomena, given our other understandings of the myriad of motives and means for undertaking economic interactions, communications and exchanges. We encounter history-friendly modelling of demand at the Marseille fi sh market, and, drawing upon graph theory, envisage the structuring impacts on economic behaviour of more or less complex patterns of interactions.
Jean-Louis Le Moigne presents an argument about 'complexity and political economy: implications for economic science' and of 'complexity and economic science: implications for political economy'. This is developed from reviewing Herbert Simon's contributions to understanding economics, organization and complexity. The main argument is that complex systems are obscured rather than made more intelligible if we adopt the conventional modelling strategy of simplification in economic and econometric modelling.
The second part of this collection comprises three chapters that address some of the fundamental principles of complexity. Uta-Maria Niederle presents a detailed and 'history-friendly' analysis of the emergence of property, arguing that human possessiveness towards specific objects together with commitments and preferences to legal regimes and principles shape patterns and outcomes of property relations. This general argument is though quite consistent with particular societal manifestations, or paths, from property to possession, depending on particular environmental and cultural endowments. Eyüp Özveren also draws upon historical analysis, and particularly the theorizing of Fernand Braudel, in which deeper structures provide some orderly basis for seemingly chaotic instances of events. Braudel's analysis presents a 'triple division' or hierarchy of: an elementary economy of material life, a domain of economic life within a market zone, and capitalism. This chapter brings a further perspective on the possibilities for 'historyfriendly' theorizing; in distinction to what he argues is the historicism of some institutional economics and the ahistoricism of new institutional economics and of new economic history.
Jan-Willem Stoelhorst addresses the second of the two themes highlighted in this introductory chapter by investigating and questioning the applicability of what he terms the 'Ultra-Darwinist' approach among fi rms and industries. A second Darwinian approach is proposed, which Stoelhorst calls a 'Naturalist' theory. Both categories fi t within Universal Darwinism, of recognizing the relevance of such arguments across social and life sciences. Stoelhorst's argument is developed further through a case study of Intel, which is presented as a case of multi-level selection and adaptation.
The third part includes three chapters that each present an analysis of transaction cost economics in the context of organizing and so connecting broadly economic activities.
Elodie Bertrand investigates the historical circumstances of Coase's famous 'lighthouses argument' and shows instead that the State had a much more supportive and involved role in the provision of lighthouses in England and Wales. Bertrand also draws upon the provision of lighthouses in France to demonstrate how the involvement of the State assisted innovation processes, and also the standardization and so replication of production and technology solutions. The role of transaction costs in affecting the connections across productive activities is also developed in two chapters, by Alexander Lascaux and by Gráinne Collins. Lascaux argues that transaction cost authors are mistaken in seeing trust as an auxiliary factor that can be planned, developed and relied upon in practice to help close exchanges where formal contractual means prove unreliable. Indeed, one of the arguments that Lascaux investigates is the possibilities that trust may become excessive in terms of causing additional transaction costs. One implication of Lascaux's chapter is that trust can be understood from within a transaction cost framework, in that its effects can be estimated.
Gráinne Collins adopts a critical stance in investigating whether trust can be developed by managers as an alternative to bureaucratic control. The fundamental and recursive feature of trust for Collins is that trusting is both a 'leap in the dark' and also the subject of calculation. We trust the means of calculation, its data, measurements, and the means of measurement, formula, theories, assumptions, qualifi cations, capabilities, competence, motivations, ethics and commitments of others. These are probably essential features of decisions and of trust. The same applies to designing and building trust.
The fi nal part of this collection is made up of four chapters that develop and report empirical analyses undertaken from a complexity perspective. Virginia Acha and Stefano Brusoni question the life-cycle theory of fi rms, industries and technologies in their investigation of the mature industry of tyre production. They show how changes in technology and organization are both on-going despite the typical symptom of maturity -the development of and then settling into oligopoly -being well-established. Maturity and oligopoly have only changed the nature of complexity both in organizational and technological terms. Indeed, complexity has increased as the industry's knowledge-base has extending during maturity to cover other distinct industrial and research groupings.
Norio Tokumaru assesses how codifi cation of technological knowledge and also the complexity of technological knowledge have interacted upon one another and upon the organization of production in the case of semiconductor production. Codifi cation has contributed to the emergence of new organizational forms in semiconductor production, but the complexity of technology and of knowledge development has led to a wider diversity of organizational forms than might have been the case had codifi cation per se been the dominant factor in affecting the organization of production. The reader is referred back to the chapters of the third part of this book to consider further the connections between complexity and transaction costs.
Lionel Nesta and Ludovic Dibiaggio question whether technology is a basis for us to proceed in investigating the reasons and consequences of fi rms differing. Instead, they investigate the sources of technological differentiation or specialization itself among companies in the biotechnology industry and fi nd a conceptual distinction between 'bodies of understanding' (usually codifi ed) and 'bodies of practice' (usually narrowly context-specifi c within fi rms) helpful. Nesta and Dibiaggio's analysis also refers to life-cycle effects, with technological differentiation being more prominent in strategies aimed at establishing niches and leaderships, but technology convergence being a symptom in their analysis of maturity. It is especially in these more mature industry circumstances that 'bodies of practice' become prominent. Cristina Matos's chapter shifts the focus of policy-making from technology strategy to employment relations, and so involves policy-making among governments as well as within companies and by employees. Matos considers post-socialist transformation among companies in Hungary and in the Czech Republic as these involve different instances of employment 'informalization'. Government policy-makers are implicated in processes of normalization, thereby stabilizing particular initiatives that can emerge from companies, and providing a basis in the form of feedback for further company-led initiatives.
